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We reexamine empirical evidence on strategic risk-taking behavior by mu-
tual fund managers. Several studies suggest that fund performance in the …rst
semester of a year in‡uences risk-taking in the second semester. However, we
show that previous empirical studies implicitly assume that idiosyncratic fund
returns (in a factor model) are uncorrelated across funds. We present general-
ized methodologies (based on both contingency tables and regression analysis)
that accommodate the case of a general error structure. We show that the
correlation between idiosyncratic fund returns is essential to the analysis and,
when it is taken into account, the empirical evidence of strategic risk taking by
fund managers disappears.
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11 Introduction
During the last two decades, the mutual fund industry experienced tremendous
growth both in number of funds and amount of assets under management. It is
not surprising that it attracts a lot of attention of the regulatory agencies that would
like to ensure that fund managers select investment strategies that are optimal from
the investors’ point of view. The joint occurrence of two well-established facts in the
mutual fund industry may lead to an agency con‡ict between mutual fund managers
and mutual fund shareholders. First, managers’ compensation is typically based on
a percentage of the fund’s net assets (see, e.g., Khorana, 1996). Second, the top-
performing funds receive the bulk of new cash in‡ows, while bad performance does
not lead to signi…cant out‡ows (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Together, these
e¤ects suggest that mutual funds participate in annual tournaments where they com-
pete for the top rankings. This leads to the conjecture that funds performing badly
during the …rst part of the year have an incentive to increase risk in the second part
of the year in order to try to catch up with mid-year winners at the end of the year.
This conjecture is called the tournament hypothesis. Chen and Pennacchi (1999) pro-
vide a theoretical model for risk-taking assuming that fund managers are evaluated
with respect to an exogenous benchmark index. They show that, in their model, poor
performing funds do not necessarily increase the volatility of their fund’s returns.
A number of studies veri…es the tournament hypothesis empirically. Brown, Har-
low, and Starks (1996) …nd evidence supporting the tournament hypothesis using a
contingency table methodology applied to monthly data. Busse (1998) uses the same
methodology with daily data and …nds that mid-year losers do not increase their risk
relative to better performing funds, contrary to the tournament hypothesis. Koski
and Ponti¤ (1998) use regression analysis and …nd a negative relation between interim
performance and subsequent change in risk, in line with the tournament hypothesis.
Finally, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) obtain di¤erent regression results depending on
whether fund risk is measured on the basis of fund portfolio holdings or monthly fund
returns.
In this paper, we show that all test procedures employed so far in the literature
implicitly assume that fund returns follow a factor structure with uncorrelated id-
iosyncratic errors across funds. This is what Chamberlain and Rothchild (1983) have
named a strict factor structure. We generalize both the contingency table and re-
gression methodologies used before to the case of a general error structure. We …nd
that the evidence of the strategic risk behavior by fund managers disappears, when
possible correlation between idiosyncratic fund returns is taken into account.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the empirical
…ndings in the literature on the impact of past performance on funds’ risk taking. We
replicate these analyses on our dataset which leads to the same results. In Section 3,
we demonstrate the validity of the methodologies used in previous papers in a strict
factor structure. We show that these methodologies tend to reject the null (i.e.,
1absence of strategic risk taking) too often when there is no strict factor structure.
We also showhow to extend the methodologies to the case of a general (i.e., non-strict)
factor structure. Our empirical results, in Section 3, show that the empirical evidence
reported in the literature disappears when possible correlation between idiosyncratic
fund returns is accounted for. Section 4 concludes.
2 Mutual fund strategic risk taking: empirical ev-
idence
All empirical studies on the tournament hypothesis referred to above use one of two
di¤erent methodologies. The …rst methodology is a contingency table approach where
Â2-tests of independence are used to test whether risk-taking during the second half of
the year is independent of realized performance during the …rst part of the year. The
second methodology is based on regression techniques to test the same hypothesis.
We discuss both methodologies, and the empirical results based on them, in more
detail now.
2.1 Contingency table approach
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Busse (1998) investigate changes in mutual
fund risk policies within a calendar year using 2 £2-contingency tables. The change
in risk from the …rst to the second part of the year of fund i is measured as the ratio







i denotes the standard deviation of monthly returns of fund i in the k-th part of
the year, k = 1;2. This ratio is called the risk adjustment ratio. According to the
tournament hypothesis, the risk adjustment ratio should be higher for interim losers
(funds ranked relatively low after the …rst part of the year) than for interim winners.
In the main speci…cation, the …rst part of the year comprises the …rst seven months
of the year. The results remain virtually unchanged when the interim assessment
period is taken to be equal to the …rst six months of the year. We will use the
latter speci…cation in this paper. Moreover, interim losers (winners) are de…ned as
funds with a return over the …rst part of the year below (above) the median return
for all funds. In an alternative speci…cation, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)
de…ne winners (losers) as funds in the top (bottom) quartile of returns over the …rst
part of the year. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the description of the main
speci…cation in the sequel.
In order to test the tournament hypothesis, 2 £ 2-contingency tables are con-
structed. Each cell represents the funds with interim return above (below) the me-
dian return and risk adjustment ratio above (below) the median risk adjustment ratio.
Under the null hypothesis that the level of the interim performance and subsequent
change in risk are independent from each other, all frequencies should be equal to
225%. The Low-High frequency, for example, represents the fraction of funds with a
return over the …rst six months below the median return and a risk adjustment ratio
above median. The tournament hypothesis then states that the Low-High frequency
is above 25%. A standard Â2-statistic for independence is then used in the empirical
analysis. The statistic is given by
Q = 16N(f ¡ 0:25)
2; (2.1)
where N denotes the number of funds and f denotes the Low-High frequency de-
…ned above. The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the tournament hypothesis if
the Â2-statistic (2.1) has a p-value (based on a Â2
1-distribution) below the required
signi…cance level.
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) examine monthly returns of 334 US growth-
oriented mutual funds during the period from 1980 to 1991. The Low-High frequency
for the whole sample appears signi…cantly di¤erent from 25% in the predicted direc-
tion. Similar results for the whole sample are obtained for the alternative speci…ca-
tions when the …rst part of the year comprises the …rst 6 months and division into
winners and losers is based on quartiles. The empirical results reported by Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996) suggest that the results obtained are sensitive to the time
period taken. Contrary to the tournament hypothesis, the Low-High frequency is
(insigni…cantly) below 25% in the …rst half of the sample. The positive …nding for
the whole sample appears to be driven by the last six years of the sample. In gen-
eral, the Low-High frequency uniformly increases with time from 22.43% in 1980-1982
to 31.22% in 1989-1991. The authors explain the observed pattern by ”the growth
of the mutual fund industry and the increased investor scrutiny that attended that
expansion”.
Busse (1998) applies the methodology of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) to
daily returns of 230 US domestic equity funds during the period from 1985 to 1995.
When using monthly returns computed from daily data, he …nds results equivalent
to those of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996). However, he …nds that the Low-High
frequency based on daily returns is not signi…cantly larger than 25% in the total
period and in most subperiods.
We replicate the contingency table analysis in each ofthe annual tournaments from
1976 to1994, in the total period, and in the subperiod 1980-1991. Our dataset consists
of monthly returns of 811 US growth funds obtained from Morningstar Mutual Fund
Database. The time span is from 1976 to 1994 including the 1989-1994 time period
for which our data are free from survivorship bias. The dataset also includes the
starting date and size (as of the end of 1994) for the funds that survived till that
time. These data will be used later on to discriminate between small and large as
well as young and old funds. For the …rst …fteen years, our dataset is virtually the
same as the dataset of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996).
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 report the Low-High frequencies f and
corresponding Â2-statistics for each of the annual periods from 1976 to 1994, the
3period 1980-1991, and the total time span of our dataset. The most striking …nding is
that the Â2-statistics vary a lot from year to year. In …ve consecutive years (from 1987
to 1991), the Low-High frequency appears signi…cantly above 25% in full accordance
with the tournament hypothesis. However, there are also four years (1977, 1978, 1983,
and 1993) where the Low-High frequency appears to be signi…cantly below 25%, which
contradicts the tournament hypothesis. Moreover, the Low-High frequency for the
overall sample seems insigni…cantly di¤erent from 25%. We defer an explanation of
these e¤ects to Section 3.
2.2 Regression based approach
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Koski and Ponti¤ (1998) test the relation between
interim performance and change in risk by considering the following relation for fund















i;t are the standard deviation of monthly returns for fund i in the
…rst and second part of year t, respectively, and Ci;t includes di¤erent controlling
variables such as year and category dummies. P
(1)
i;t represents a measure of fund i’s
performance in the …rst part of year t. This is either fund i’s return in excess of the
market (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) or in excess of the mean return of funds with
the same investment objective (Koski and Ponti¤, 1998). The level of risk in the
…rst part of the year ¾
(1)
i;t is included in the regression in order to control for mean
reversion in the noisy component of the risk measure employed.
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) examine 449 US growth and growth and income
funds in 1983-1993 and …nd a positive coe¢cient on P
(1)
i;t , which contradicts the
tournament hypothesis. However, they obtain opposite results when fund risk is
measured on the basis of historical returns of stocks comprising the fund equity
portfolio. Koski and Ponti¤ (1998) use the dataset of 798 US equity funds and …nd a
negative relation between interim performance and subsequent change in risk, in line
with the tournament hypothesis.
We also replicate the regression analysis in each of the annual tournaments from
1976 to 1994, in the total period, and in the subperiods corresponding to other stud-
ies. We speci…ed P
(1)
i;t simply as fund i’s return in the …rst part of year t. With one
fund category and year dummies, we would get the same results if we would specify
performance as an excess return. The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report the
coe¢cients on P
(1)
i;t and corresponding t-statistics for the annual periods, the sample
periods of other studies, and the total time span of our dataset. Similarly to the
results based on contingency tables, there is a lot of variation between performance
coe¢cients across years. The relation between risk and performance appears signif-
icantly positive in seven years (1976, 1977, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1987, and 1993) and
signi…cantly negative in three years (1984, 1991, and 1994). The performance coe¢-
4cients measured over the longer time spans seem signi…cantly positive in three out of
four cases.
Summarizing, for both the contingency table approach and the regression ap-
proach mixed evidence with respect to the tournament hypothesis has been reported
in the literature. Using our dataset, which di¤ers slightly from those used in other
papers, we obtain the same results. In the next section, we take a closer look at
the statistical properties of the tests, which will enable us to explain these …ndings.
Moreover, this analysis allows us to adapt p-values and unify the answers of all testing
methodologies.
3 Detailed discussion of tournament tests
In order to explain the contribution of the present paper, we recall the di¤erent uses
of the term “factor model” in the …nancial and statistical literature. In any factor
model, the return of fund i in month t is written as
Ri;t = ®i + ¯
T
i Ft + "i;t; (3.1)
where Ft denotes the (vector valued) factor for month t. For each month t, the vector
of error terms "t ´ ("1;t;:::;"N;t)T is, by construction, uncorrelated with the factors
Ft. Without further conditions, (3.1) is nothing but an orthogonal decomposition of
returns into a part explained by the factors and a part orthogonal to the factors. Thus,
it does not describe a testable restriction. Content is only added to (3.1) by imposing
extra restrictions. In …nance, following the seminal research by Fama and French,
the term “factor model” is used to denote the situation where, for each asset i, the
constant term ®i is related to asset-speci…c factor-loadings ¯i and asset-independent
risk-premiums for the factors. In the statistical literature, on the contrary, the term
“factor model” is used to denote the situation where the idiosyncratic errors "i;t are
uncorrelated across funds, i.e., §" = var("t) is diagonal. This second situation is
what Chamberlain and Rothchild (1983) have named a strict factor structure.
The size properties of the contingency table approach as well as the regression
approach are based on standard central limit arguments. Whether or not fund re-
turns satisfy a Fama-French type factor structure is irrelevant for the behavior of the
contingency table or regression tests as described in Section 2. However, a neces-
sary condition for the central limit arguments is that fund returns are “su¢ciently
independent”. In the appendix, we prove rigorously that, for the contingency table
approach, the Â2-statistic indeed has a Â2
1 limiting null distribution if fund returns
follow a strict factor model. Using the same line of reasoning, the limiting null dis-
tribution of the t-statistic (in the regression approach) is indeed standard normal
for the strict factor case. However, when the idiosyncratic errors of individual funds
are cross-correlated, i.e., when the variance matrix of the errors is not diagonal, the
Â2-statistic (2.1) and the t-statistic on the performance coe¢cient ®2 in 2.2 are more
5variable and the null hypothesis will be rejected too often if Â2
1 and standard-normal
p-values are used.
Mutual funds often belong to a limited number of mutual fund families. In that
case, it seems reasonable that idiosyncratic errors in some factor model are correlated
across funds. In order to accommodate this situation, we determine the distribution
of the tournament tests, under the null of no strategic risk-taking, using simulation
based on (3.1). The exact choice of the factors (which is, of course, material for
pricing applications) is irrelevant for the problem at hand as we will explain shortly.
For each month t, the vector of error terms "t is assumed to be normally distributed
with variance matrix §"). Using factor loadings and variances that are estimated from
observed fund returns using standard regression, we simulate realized fund returns
from (3.1) imposing no tournament e¤ect and calculate the realization of both the
Â2- and t-statistic. This is replicated 10,000 times from which the empirical p-values
for both methodologies are obtained.
This way of simulating adapted p-values has a particularly nice invariance prop-
erty. The simulated fund returns (and, consequently, the simulated p-values) are
independent of the choice of the factors Ft. Hence, in the null simulation we assume
without loss of generality that ¯i = 0 and ®i equals the observed average return for
fund i. The variance is then simply equal to the sample variance of the fund returns.
Note that our simulations assume normality of monthly fund returns. Clearly, this
normality assumption is innocuous, if su¢cient regularity conditions are satis…ed for
a central limit theorem to hold true. It is important that the simulation setup allows
idiosyncratic errors to be correlated across funds.
The simulation approach is the same for both the contingency table approach
and the regression approach. We discuss the empirical results for them separately.
First, we simulated 10,000 replications of the contingency tables for each year from
1976 to 1994 and the two time spans of interest: 1980-1991 and 1976-1994. In each
replication, we compute the Low-High frequency and the Â2-statistic (2.1). Given
the empirical distribution of the Â2-statistics, we calculate adapted p-values for the
actual Â2-statistics (see Column 6 of Table 1). The adapted p-values are much larger
than the p-values of the Â2
1 distribution that have been reported in the literature1.
This is due to the fact that the dependencies induce much less degrees of freedom
than the number of observations suggests.2 These results imply that using Â2
1-based
p-values for the Â2-statistic (2.1) may lead to incorrect inference, namely rejecting
the null hypothesis too often. When we use adapted p-values, then only in one year
out of 19 (year 1991), the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. We attribute
1Using a bootstrap procedure which maintains the cross correlation across funds, Busse (1998)
also …nds adapted p-values much larger than Â2
1-based p-values. However, he does not explain the
source of this …nding.
2For completeness, we also simulated assuming a strict factor model, i.e. assuming that the
variance matrix §" is diagonal. As expected, the simulated p-values in this case coincide with the
p-values of the Â2
1 distribution.
6this to sampling error.
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) argue that small funds and new funds are more
likely to adjust their risk in response to the tournament incentives. Indeed, they …nd
that the Low-High frequency for small funds and new funds is typically larger than
among large and old funds. In order to check the robustness of these results, we
repeat our analysis for the subsets of small funds and young funds (see Tables 3
and 4, respectively). We de…ne small (young) funds as funds with size (age) below
median in a given year. The Low-High frequencies for small and young funds seem to
be more variable than among all funds. However, most of them appear insigni…cantly
di¤erent from 25% when we use adapted p-values. For both small and young fund
subsets, we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level in only two years (1983 and
1991 for small funds and 1978 and 1983 for young funds).
We use the same methodology to obtain the null distribution of the t-statistic for
the performance coe¢cient ®2 in regression (2.2). We perform the analysis for each
year from 1976 to 1994 and for three longer time spans: 1983-1993, 1992-1994 and
1976-1994. The …rst two of the three time spans correspond to the sample periods of
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Koski and Ponti¤ (1998), respectively. The last one
is our full sample period. In each of 10,000 replications, we estimate the performance
coe¢cient ®2 and the corresponding t-statistic. Using the empirical distribution of
this t-statistic, we calculate adapted (one-sided) p-values (see Column 6 of Table 2).
As in the case of the contingency table approach, the adapted p-values for the t-
statistics are much larger than the p-values of the Student distribution. Using adapted
p-values, we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level only in two years out of nineteen
(1978 and 1983). Similar results are obtained for the subsets of small and young funds.
Thus, when we relax the assumption of the strict factor structure for mutual fund
returns, the evidence of strategic risk-taking behavior among mutual funds disap-
pears, irrespectively of the sample period and methodology used. Taking the cor-
relation between idiosyncratic errors into account, there seems to be no evidence of
excessive risk taking of mutual fund managers caused by tournament behavior. The
same conclusion applies to the subsets of small and young funds.
4 Conclusion
The empirical evidence on a convex relation between mutual fund ‡ows and their past
performance (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998) inspired numerous studies of funds’
risk-taking behavior. Most of them investigate how a change in risk between the …rst
and second semester is in‡uenced by fund performance in the …rst semester. Two
basic research techniques have been used: contingency tables (see Brown, Harlow,
and Starks, 1996, and Busse, 1998) and regressions (see Chevalier and Ellison, 1997,
and Koski and Ponti¤, 1998). In this paper, we demonstrate that both methodolo-
gies implicitly assume that fund returns are generated from a strict factor structure.
7We propose a generalization based on simulated p-values that does not rely on this
assumption. Using this technique, we …nd no evidence of strategic risk-taking irre-
spective of the methodology or sample period used.
A Appendix: Limiting distribution of the test statis-
tics
In this appendix, we derive the limiting distribution of both the Â2- and t- test
statistics mentioned in the main text assuming that mutual fund returns are generated
from a strict factor model. Thus, we assume for the moment that, for fund returns
in month t,
Ri;t = ®i + ¯
T
i Ft + "i;t; (A.1)
where Ft denotes the vector of factors and where the idiosyncratic errors "i;t are inde-
pendently N(0;¾2
i) distributed3. De…ne the sample average and the sample volatility
of fund i’s returns in semester k as ^ ¹
(k)
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(k)
i )2:
Let F denote the information in the factors over the complete observational period,
i.e. F = ¾(F1;F2;:::). Now, conditionally on F and under the null hypothesis, the
statistics ^ ¹
(1)
i , ^ ¹
(2)
i , ^ ¾
(1)
i , and ^ ¾
(2)
i are independently distributed. For the Â2-statistic,




i and the …rst semester returns,
implies that (conditionally on F and under the null) the standard Â2-test statistic for
independence Q in (2.1) follows, asymptotically, a Â2





For regression tests, the independence of the idiosyncratic errors "i;t across funds,
guarantees the validity of the standard t-test by the same arguments.
In case the idiosyncratic errors "i;t are correlated across funds, the arguments
above no longer hold, even asymptotically. In that case, the number of unbounded
eigenvalues of the variance of fund returns is generally in…nite and limiting results
can no longer be established analytically in general.
3Clearly, normality is, asymptotically, irrelevant for the main results in this appendix as long as
variances exist.
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9Year # funds Low-High Â2-statistic p-value p-value
frequency (Â2
1) (adapted)
1976 119 25.21 0.01 0.9270 0.9409
1977 123 16.26 15.03 0.0001 0.1393
1978 128 14.06 24.50 0.0000 0.0697
1979 131 26.34 0.37 0.5408 0.7637
1980 132 27.27 1.09 0.2963 0.6629
1981 139 21.58 2.60 0.1071 0.5520
1982 144 23.61 0.44 0.5050 0.7146
1983 160 17.19 15.63 0.0001 0.0939
1984 181 24.03 0.27 0.6029 0.8304
1985 203 24.88 0.00 0.9440 0.9543
1986 235 23.40 0.96 0.3278 0.7357
1987 271 31.00 15.59 0.0001 0.2450
1988 315 29.68 11.05 0.0009 0.3986
1989 336 27.68 3.86 0.0495 0.5732
1990 357 29.69 12.57 0.0004 0.2968
1991 392 34.82 60.50 0.0000 0.0386
1992 425 24.94 0.00 0.9613 0.9816
1993 520 18.75 32.50 0.0000 0.1852
1994 635 26.30 1.71 0.1903 0.7638
1980-91 2865 26.86 15.84 0.0001 0.2217
1976-94 4946 25.01 0.00 0.9773 0.9876
Table 1: Results of the contingency table approach for all funds. The Low-High
column gives the percentage of funds with both a total return over the …rst six
months below median and a risk adjustment ratio above median. The Â2-statistic
tests the null hypothesis that population percentages are equal to 25%. Column …ve
presents the p-values of the Â2-statistic based on the Â2
1 distribution. The last column
reports adapted p-values for the Â2-statistic. See main text for details.
10Year # funds ®2 t-statistic p-value p-value
(Student) (adapted)
1976 119 0.04 2.75 0.0034 0.3464
1977 123 0.07 6.08 0.0000 0.0982
1978 128 0.27 10.03 0.0000 0.0474
1979 131 0.03 1.77 0.0399 0.5106
1980 132 0.04 1.43 0.0772 0.5385
1981 139 -0.02 -1.26 0.1045 0.4626
1982 144 -0.02 -1.27 0.1037 0.3590
1983 160 0.09 9.05 0.0000 0.0265
1984 181 -0.09 -4.04 0.0000 0.3117
1985 203 0.03 1.93 0.0276 0.4190
1986 235 0.04 3.81 0.0001 0.2649
1987 271 0.09 3.89 0.0001 0.2958
1988 315 0.01 0.77 0.2222 0.5160
1989 336 0.01 0.69 0.2449 0.6019
1990 357 -0.01 -0.69 0.2592 0.4888
1991 392 -0.04 -3.58 0.0002 0.1297
1992 425 0.00 -0.55 0.2900 0.4716
1993 520 0.03 5.53 0.0000 0.2090
1994 635 -0.03 -6.10 0.0000 0.1993
1983-93 3395 0.02 6.01 0.0000 0.2839
1992-94 1580 0.00 0.32 0.3732 0.4894
1976-94 4946 0.02 7.30 0.0000 0.2627
Table 2: Results of the regression analysis for all funds. The third and fourth columns
present the coe¢cient on interim performance and corresponding t-statistic. Column
…ve presents the p-values of the t-statistic based on the Student distribution. The
last column reports adapted p-values of the t-statistic. See main text for details.
11Year # funds Low-High Â2-statistic p-value p-value
frequency (Â2
1) (adapted)
1976 57 22.81 0.44 0.5078 0.6825
1977 59 16.10 7.47 0.0063 0.1587
1978 61 13.11 13.79 0.0002 0.0665
1979 63 28.57 1.29 0.2568 0.5517
1980 63 19.84 2.68 0.1015 0.3800
1981 66 18.18 4.91 0.0267 0.3378
1982 69 22.46 0.71 0.3994 0.6779
1983 75 13.33 16.33 0.0001 0.0225
1984 83 25.30 0.01 0.9126 1.0000
1985 93 23.66 0.27 0.6041 0.7168
1986 107 22.90 0.76 0.3843 0.7220
1987 123 31.71 8.85 0.0029 0.2034
1988 142 29.58 4.76 0.0291 0.4592
1989 154 25.97 0.23 0.6287 0.9012
1990 167 28.44 3.17 0.0751 0.4863
1991 184 36.41 38.35 0.0000 0.0112
1992 203 24.88 0.00 0.9440 1.0000
1993 249 18.88 14.94 0.0001 0.1763
1994 314 27.07 2.15 0.1423 0.6643
1980-91 1326 26.70 6.11 0.0135 0.2821
1976-94 2332 25.00 0.00 1.0000 1.0000
Table 3: Results of the contingency table approach for small funds. The Low-High
column gives the percentage of small funds with both a total return over the …rst six
months below median and a risk adjustment ratio above median. The Â2-statistic
tests the null hypothesis that population percentages are equal to 25%. Column …ve
presents the p-values of the Â2-statistic based on the Â2
1 distribution. The last column
reports adapted p-values of the Â2-statistic. See main text for details.
12Year # funds Low-High Â2-statistic p-value p-value
frequency (Â2
1) (adapted)
1976 54 25.93 0.07 0.7855 0.7701
1977 56 14.29 10.29 0.0013 0.0932
1978 57 11.40 16.86 0.0000 0.0419
1979 59 26.27 0.15 0.6961 0.7730
1980 59 20.34 2.05 0.1521 0.4411
1981 62 19.35 3.16 0.0754 0.3197
1982 65 23.85 0.14 0.7098 0.7713
1983 70 15.71 9.66 0.0019 0.0475
1984 79 22.78 0.62 0.4310 0.6558
1985 88 23.86 0.18 0.6698 0.7310
1986 101 24.26 0.09 0.7653 0.8474
1987 117 30.34 5.34 0.0208 0.3167
1988 135 28.52 2.67 0.1020 0.5688
1989 147 30.27 6.54 0.0106 0.3078
1990 160 29.38 4.90 0.0269 0.3280
1991 177 35.03 28.48 0.0000 0.0547
1992 199 27.14 1.45 0.2282 0.6918
1993 249 17.87 20.24 0.0000 0.1132
1994 314 22.93 2.15 0.1423 0.6150
1980-91 1260 26.75 6.15 0.0132 0.2792
1976-94 2248 24.51 0.86 0.3534 0.6999
Table 4: Results of the contingency table approach for young funds. The Low-High
column gives the percentage of young funds with both a total return over the …rst
six months below median and a risk adjustment ratio above median. The Â2-statistic
tests the null hypothesis that population percentages are equal to 25%. Column …ve
presents the p-values of the Â2-statistic based on the Â2
1 distribution. The last column
reports adapted p-values of the Â2-statistic. See main text for details.
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